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I. Introduction: The Broadest and Most Prominent Standard in
Investment Treaties
In 2007, the Tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey highlighted that the standard of fair and
equitable treatment (FET) had become the prominent standard invoked before
investment arbitral tribunals.1 Ever since, the pace of this movement of FET to the
centre of the investment dispute agenda has remained steady and has intensified. An
empirical study to quantify the percentage volume of FET arguments in the pleadings
before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
tribunals would certainly point to a role of FET discourse that would not have been
anticipated a decade ago.2
While these developments may be surprising, at first sight, it is not difficult to
understand the reasons for this evolution. Firstly, bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
only set forth limited number of (often seven) substantive absolute standards. Secondly,
the FET rule is certainly the broadest of all of them, susceptible to cover a much wider
range of activities than other rules. Accordingly, investment lawyers representing
claimants naturally seek to tailor their cases and their arguments so that they will be
subsumed under the FET standard.
To recognize this setting does not mean to be critical of the existence of or nature of
the standard, or of its role in practice. The wide range of measures by the host state with
inappropriately negative effects on the investor must be taken into account in this
context. Thus, FET may be considered to be at the heart of investment arbitration
because of the vastness of factual situations pertaining to host state actions affecting the
rights and interests of the investor. Noble v. Romania has reminded us, generally, of the
scope of the standard.3 Even if a host state’s measure does not fall under any particular

1.

2.
3.
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See PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶ 238 (Jan. 19,
2007), http://italaw.com/documents/PSEGGlobal-Turkey-Award.pdf [hereinafter PSEG Award].
See also Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech, Partial Award, ¶ 284 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006) [hereinafter Saluka
Partial Award], 15 ICSID Rep. 274 (2010).
The first tribunal to apply the standard was Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Maffezini Award], 5 ICSID Rep.
419 (2002).
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 182 (Sep. 12 2005),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf. For factual settings which
do not clearly fall into one of the frequently quoted sub-categories, see, e.g., Paushok v. Gov't of
Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liab. (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. April 28, 2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf [hereinafter Paushok Award] (concerning an
owner of gold deprived of rights by untimely selling of gold by government); Total S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liab. (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/TotalvArgentina_DecisionOnLiabilty.pdf [hereinafter Total Decision]
(concerning the failure by government to readjust equilibrium of tariffs at the end of a state of
emergency); and Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award (Oct.
20, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0026.pdf [hereinafter Alpha
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expression of FET, this does not necessarily mean that the measure is in conformity with
the standard. In other words, the standard is not amenable to all-embracing definitions
that will cover all conceivable cases.
Conceptually, it is important to note that the duty to accord fair and equitable
treatment extends to all subject matters. It is not the importance of an economic sector to
the host state or to the investor, but the treatment of the investor by the host state which
will be examined under FET clause.4
To decide whether or not the standard has justly found its current place in investment
treaties, and in investment arbitration, is a task that is best undertaken by way of
judging the results of arbitral practice in specific cases. The question to be asked is: “In
view of the facts of the case, will it be appropriate to conclude that claimant was treated
in fair and equitable manner?” Anecdotal experience in the classroom suggests that the
answers in most cases are more uniform than may be anticipated.
As a matter of legal discourse, the key issue has been whether the understanding of
the standard’s nature and function and its application has matured enough to make it
manageable on the operational level so that it is justified to speak of a legally distinct,
manageable rule available for practical purposes of investment arbitration. The following
observations will seek to address this question.

II. The Nature and Function of the FET Rule
In 2007, the Tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey properly characterized the nature and role of
the FET rule as follows:
The standard of fair and equitable treatment has acquired prominence
in investment arbitration as a consequence of the fact that other
standards traditionally provided by international law might not in the
circumstances of each case be entirely appropriate. This is particularly
the case when the facts of the dispute do not clearly support the claim
for direct expropriation, but when there are notwithstanding events
that need to be assessed under a different standard to provide redress
in the event that the rights of the investor have been breached.
Because the role of fair and equitable treatment changes from case to
case, it is sometimes not as precise as would be desirable. Yet, it clearly
does allow for justice to be done in the absence of the more traditional
breaches of international law standards. This role has resulted in the

4.

Award] (concerning government stop payments of contractual debtor and for failure of debtor to
fulfill its obligations).
See, e.g., Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467,
Final Award, ¶ 191 (July 1, 2004), http://italaw.com/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf
[hereinafter Occidental Final Award] (discussing application of value-added tax, not tax as such);
and PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 246-247 (finding that the style of negotiations may violate the
FET standard).
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concept of fair and equitable treatment acquiring a standing on its own,
separate and distinct from that of other standards, albeit many times
closely related to them, and thus ensuring that the protection granted
to the investment is fully safeguarded.5
In 2012, Swisslion v. Macedonia subscribed “to the view expressed by certain
tribunals that the [FET] standard basically ensures that the foreign investor is not
unjustly treated, with due regard to all surrounding circumstances, and that it is a
means to guarantee justice to foreign investors.” 6
In a broad sense, acceptance of the standard is a response to the danger of the
“obsolescent bargain” which may threaten an investor who was welcomed by the host
state before his investment, who sunk its money into the project, but who later on finds
itself subject to the upper hand of the host state. Desert Line v. Yemen addressed this
basic issue inherent in the nature of long-term investment in the light of the
circumstances of the case before it as follows:
It would offend the most elementary notions of good faith, and insulting to the
Head of State, to imagine that he offered his assurances and acceptance [of the
investment] with his fingers crossed, as it were, making a reservation to the effect
“that we welcome you, but will not extend to you the benefits of our BIT with your
country.” 7
Similar to clauses in classical civil codes in Continental Europe, the FET standard
serves to address such acts and occurrences which do not fall into the net of specific
standards but nevertheless are deemed to be inconsistent with the object and purpose of
the BIT, i.e., to protect and promote foreign investment and thereby to contribute to the
economic goals of the host state, as often recognized in BIT preambles.
The acceptance of the standard is directly linked to the fundamental moral and legal
grounding of the notion of fairness, anchored in a universally accepted sense of justice,
but also in classic rules of customary law governing the protection of foreign nationals
and companies. Elihu Root stated the position in a prominent article a century ago:
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of the
world. The condition upon which any country is entitled to measure the justice due

5.
6.
7.
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PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 238-239.
Swisslion DOO Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16,
Award, ¶ 273 (July 6, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1080.pdf.
See also PSEG Award, supra note 1.
Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 119
(Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0248_0.pdf. See
also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award ¶ 254 (Sept. 5,
2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf [hereinafter Cont’l
Cas. Award] (adopting this view). FET “is aimed at assuring that the normal law-abiding
conduct of the business activity by the foreign investor is not hampered without good reasons
by the host government and other authorities.” Cont’l Cas. Award, ¶ 254.
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from it to an alien by the justice which it accords to its own citizens is that its
system of law and administration shall conform to this general standard. If any
country’s system of law and administration does not conform to that standard,
although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no
other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of
treatment to its citizens.8
Often is has been assumed that the traditional capital-exporting countries in general
have stood for a wide version of the standard, whereas southern countries preferred a
narrow one. However, from today’s perspective, this generalisation is flawed. What is
well-known is that the United States has turned to a narrow approach. What has
received less attention is that China, with the most BITs worldwide except for Germany,
has adopted the widest possible approach, that is, an unqualified version of FET.
Essentially, the United States has become concerned about the need to defend cases
concerning inward investments as respondent, while China has focused on its role as
outward investor and the need for fair treatment of Chinese investments abroad. In other
words, the FET standard does not, at least not today, pitch northern and southern states
against each other. The landscape of investment arbitration has been transformed in the
past decade, and the role of FET with it.
Is it fair to expect fair and equitable treatment by a host state? To rephrase the
question is helpful: “Should a state inviting foreign investment claim to have the right of
unfair and inequitable treatment of the foreign investors with their capital and
technology to be employed in the foreign host state?” This, of course, is a rhetorical
question.

III. Methodology: Applying the Rule
As regards the methodology of applying the standard, the effort to deduce a conclusion
directly from the standard, as such, has not appeared to be attractive, for understandable
reasons.9 While the facts of a case may be subject to a general sense of justice, tribunals
will properly seek to articulate their reasoning with more specificity. Efforts to employ
abstract reasoning with the help of broad ancillary definitions of FET (such as those

8.
9.

Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 521-22
(1910).
But see The Rompetrol Group NV v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶¶ 195-197 (May 6,
2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1408.pdf. The Tribunal
seems to agree with the list approach but then proceeds to state that it will “follow the ordinary
meaning of the words used, in their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the BIT.”
Id. ¶ 197. The Tribunal adds that “it will take into particular account the two general elements
that other tribunals have found come into play in connection with claims to ‘fair and equitable
treatment,’ namely the way in which the foreign investor or the foreign investment have been
treated by the organs of the host State (whether in a regulatory context or otherwise), measured
against the expectations legitimately entertained by the foreign investor in making its
investment.” Id.
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found in dictionaries) may be of some argumentative value as starting points for the
more concrete discussion of the case.
The preferred method has been to unfold the standard on the basis of casuistic subgroups which will be seen as typical emanations of the standards. More and more
tribunals have turned to such sub-groups and found them useful for the articulation of
and application of the standard. A tribunal may focus only on one criterion relevant to its
case. An increasing number of tribunals, however, have assumed the broader task to set
forth a list of components which, in their entirety, may compose the full reach of the FET
standard.
For the first time, the “list approach” was employed in Tecmed v. Mexico (Tecmed):
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the
good faith principle established by international law, requires the Contracting
Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the
investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent
manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply
with such regulations . . . . The foreign investor also expects the host State to act
consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its
commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities.
The investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually
assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment
without the required compensation. 10
For the assessment of the present state of the law, it bears emphasis that the Tecmed
Award has been, and remains, the award most often cited in arbitral jurisprudence,
obviously with more persuasive power than other attempts to approach the standard. As
we shall see, not every single word of the Tecmed Award has to be accepted uncritically.
Other tribunals have set forth lists similar in nature, albeit not identical.11 A stocktaking today will record at the outset that this rise of the standard has not come about
10.
11.

14

Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed Award], 10 ICSID Rep. 134
(2006).
See Deutsche Bank AG v. Dem. Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award,
¶ 420 (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf
(citing Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (April
30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004)); Spyridon Roussalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶
314 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf
[hereinafter Spyridon Roussalis Award] (citing Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 605 (July 29, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0728.pdf [hereinafter Rumeli Award]); Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The
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without criticism.12 Neither has this rise been straightforward as regards the views and
practice of states, with the consequence of the introduction of a number of variations of
the standards, sometimes seriously or drastically restricting its scope.
The values inherent and embodied in the rule notwithstanding, the standard may be
seen from a critical perspective in view of the subjectivity to which its application may
subject the host state. Here, we get to the centre of the debate surrounding FET. Two
separate issues must be distinguished in this context. Firstly as we all know, the current
system of investment arbitration has not been designed in order to promote uniformity or
consistency of either rule-making or rule-interpretation,13 with the sprawling
consequences which we have seen, producing diversity of approaches to most rules,
including FET. The second issue of the FET standard which, it is said, renders its
application unpredictable and unmanageable, pertains to the argument of its inherently
subjective nature.
No one will doubt the inherent breadth of the terms fair and equitable which are in
practice understood together as one concept. At the same time, it will also be recognized
that arbitral jurisprudence has succeeded enough to unfold the concept in a casuistic
manner leading to groups and clusters of subgroups with more defined contours. My own
count of these, leads me to these clusters, with some overlap: good faith in the conduct of
a party, consistency of conduct, transparency of rules, recognition of the scope and
purpose of laws, due process, prohibition of harassment, a reasonable degree of stability
and predictability of the legal system, and, in particular, recognition of the legitimate
expectation on the part of the investor to which I will turn later. I consider that
arbitrariness and discrimination also fall under the heading of FET, even though
separate, specific rules in investment treaties may (or may not) address these concepts.

12.

13.

Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, ¶¶ 151-159 (June 7 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1013.pdf [hereinafter Toto Award]
(citing and describing earlier relevant cases); Bosh Int’l, Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11,
Award,
¶
212
(Oct.
5,
2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1118.pdf (citing Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liab., ¶ 284 (Jan. 14, 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0454.pdf); Total Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 110; Oostergetel v. Slovk., UNCITRAL Ad
Hoc
Arb.,
Final
Award,
¶
222
(Apr.
23,
2012),
http://old.italaw.com/documents/OostergetelvSlovakRepublic.pdf [hereinafter Oostergetel Final
Award] (citing cases for legitimate expectations); and Paushok Award, supra note 3, ¶ 253
(following the Rumeli Award).
See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on
Annulment,
¶
67
(Mar.
21,
2007),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0546.pdf [hereinafter MTD Award] (proposing a standard for legitimate
expectations which would, in effect, come close to abandoning this component). The Committee’s
reasoning is circular in nature.
See R. Dolzer, Perspectives for Investment Arbitration: Consistency as a Policy Goal, 3 TRANSNAT’L
DISP. MGMT. J. (2012), www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1823
(available by subscription or purchase).
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The point here is to emphasize the evolution of the jurisprudence in general of the
FET standard by way of developing operationally distinct subcategories of conduct meant
to detail the meaning of the standard. These sub-categories, if rightly understood, do not
depend on subjective views of the investor, but on the objective conduct of the host state.
Here, it also needs to be recalled that the degree of protection granted cannot be
determined from the individual vantage point of the investor above; instead the laws,
regulations and the conduct of the host state, expressed in objectively demonstrable
terms, must serve as the appropriate framework for legitimate expectations.
Otherwise, the unilateral viewpoint of the investor would determine the application of
the standard. As regards the Tecmed approach, I consider that its phrase “basic
expectations” must be understood as the sum of the objective elements discussed in the
subsequent passage.14

IV.The Current Architecture of the FET Standard
The multifaceted jurisprudence on FET shall now be reconstrued and reduced to its
recurrent individual components as they appear in arbitral jurisprudence. As pointed out
earlier, these components do not cover the entire scope of the rule’s application. Also, it
will be recognized that the components may overlap in their restrictive reach. It is
generally recognized today that legitimate expectations arise out of the objective conduct
of the host state and not out of subjective postulates of the investor. No BIT standard
exists which derives its content from the unilateral viewpoint of one side, be it the
investor or the host state. A point that remains to be decided concerns the manner in
which the investor must show that the state’s objective conduct gave rise to expectations
on the part of the investor.

A. Good Faith
As is well known, the principle of good faith is recognized as a general principle of law,
and thus a source of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.15 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes
the role of the principle specifically for the purpose of interpreting a treaty.16
As to the significance of good faith in investment law, it has been said that the
principle “permeates the whole approach”17 to investor protection and, more particularly,

14.
15.
16.
17.
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Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 154.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 1, available at, http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/CTCTreaties.aspx?id=23&subid=A&lang=en.
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 299 (Sept. 28,
2007), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf.
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that is “at the heart of the concept of fair and equitable treatment,”18 as a “guiding
beacon . . . to the obligation[s].”19 In a similar way, Waste Management v Mexico, for
instance, addressing Article 1105 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), has considered the obligation to act in good faith as a “basic obligation” under
the FET standard.20
One obvious application of the notion of good faith is the duty to act for cause, and not
for purely arbitrary reasons of domestic politics.21 Good faith may overlap with the rule
on arbitrary treatment and often with other components such as consistency. In many
cases, good faith will be subsumed, and only the other components may be discussed.

B. Legitimate Expectations: The State of the Law
The inherent legal affinity between fair and equitable treatment, good faith, and the
protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations has rightly been recognized and
highlighted by investment tribunals. The protection of legitimate expectations by the
FET standard will today properly be considered as the central pillar in the
understanding and application of the FET standard. In 2012, the Tribunal in Electrabel
v. Hungary22 highlighted that “the most important function” of the FET standard is the
protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations.
The rationale and justification for the recognition of legitimate expectations seems
obvious. The investor makes its calculations and decisions in the light of the law of the
host state as it is made available to it by the host state, and the investor’s assumptions
about the return for its investment will depend upon the stability and predictability of
those laws. Had the legal order been different, this decision to invest might have been
different.
From the viewpoint of the host country, it appears not unreasonable to accept the
benchmark of the legal order which it has adopted for itself at the time of the investment.
This way, the host state’s exercise of its sovereign rights is respected, albeit focused on
the time it admitted the investment.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. ¶ 298.
Id. ¶ 297.
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 138 (April
30, 2004) [hereinafter Waste Mgmt. Award], 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004).
Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, ¶ 233 (Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Eureko
Partial Award], 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007).
Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law
and Liab., ¶ 7.75 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1071clean.pdf [hereinafter Electrabel Decision].
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1.

The Rise of Legitimate Expectations: Consolidated Jurisprudence

In a series of decisions, arbitral jurisprudence has unfolded the essence of fair and
equitable treatment and has identified the significance of legitimate expectations for
understanding the standard.23 The main points in this evolution over the past decade will
be traced below in a brief consideration of the relevant decisions. The key issue has been
to identify the parameters of those types of conduct, on the part of the host state, which
determine the boundaries of the sphere of legally relevant expectations.
- In 2003, Tecmed required that the host state respect the basic expectations of the
investor at the time of the investment and act without revoking any decisions, in an
arbitrary manner upon which the investor had relied in planning its investment.24
- A year later, in 2004, Occidental v. Ecuador confirmed that the unilateral change of
the legal and contractual framework existing at the item of the original investment
would frustrate the investor’s legitimate expectations and thereby violate the FET
standard.25
- In 2006, the Tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina stated that the understanding of FET
involves consideration of the investor’s expectations when making its investment in
reliance on the protections to be granted by the host state.26
- Also in 2006, Thunderbird v. Mexico ruled that an investor may rely on the host
state’s conduct which creates justifiable expectations:
[T]he concept of “legitimate expectations” relates . . . to a situation where a
Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the
part of an investor (or an investment) to act in reliance on such conduct, such that
a failure by the Party to honor those expectations could cause the investor (or the
investment) to suffer damages.27
- In National Grid v. Argentina, the Tribunal ruled that the FET standards protect the
investor’s expectations, which were “reasonable and legitimate in the context in which

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

18

The terminology is not uniform. Some tribunals speak of “reasonable” or “justified”
expectations. However, “legitimate” expectations is preferred here as it provides for a more
contextual argumentative basis. The use of the term “basic expectations” in the Tecmed
decision raises the issue whether the subjective views of the investors by themselves should be
considered as the yardstick for legitimate expectations.
Tecmed Award., supra note 10, ¶ 159.
Occidental Final Award, supra note 4, ¶¶ 184-192.
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liab., ¶ 127
(Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Decision], http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0460.pdf.
Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, ¶ 147 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf [hereinafter
Thunderbird Award].
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the investment was made.”28 Here, the Tribunal pointed to the economic situation to the
regulatory legal framework of the host state and to the inducement of the investment by
the host state.29
- In 2010, the Tribunal in Suez v Argentina summarized the state of the law and
highlighted the investor’s legitimate reliance on the host state’s laws and regulations:
In examining the various cases that have justifiably considered the legitimate
expectations of investors and the extent to which the host government has
frustrated them, this Tribunal finds that an important element of such cases has
not been sufficiently emphasized: that investors, deriving their expectations from
the laws and regulations adopted by the host country, acted in reliance upon those
laws and regulations and changed their economic position as a result. Thus, it was
not the investor’s legitimate expectations alone that led tribunals to find a denial of
fair and equitable treatment. It was the existence of such expectations created by
host country laws, coupled with the act of investing their capital in reliance on
them, and a subsequent, sudden change in those laws that led to a determination
that the host country had not treated the investors fair and equitably.30
- In a further step, in Lemire v. Ukraine, the Tribunal, addressing an investment in
the radio section, ruled to include, in the protection granted by the FET standard, “the
common level of legal comfort which any protected foreign investor in the radio sector
could expect.”31
- The new dominance of the role of legitimate expectations for the understanding of
fair and equitable treatment was confirmed in 2011 in El Paso v. Argentina. “There is an
overwhelming trend to consider the touchstone of fair and equitable treatment to be
found in the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Parties, which derive from the
obligation of good faith.”32
The situation so described was not entirely new. As early as 2006, Saluka v. Czech
Republic (Saluka) had observed the same position.33

28.
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National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ¶ 175 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 3, 2008),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf [hereinafter National Grid
Award].
Id. ¶¶ 176-180.
Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liab., ¶ 226 (July 30, 2010),
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf.
Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award, ¶ 70 (Mar. 28, 2001),
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0454.pdf [hereinafter Lemire Award].
El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 03/15, Award, ¶ 348 (Oct. 27,
2011), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf [hereinafter El Paso
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2.

A Summary of the Current State of the Law

In the light of the arbitral jurisprudence, the details of the current state of the law
will be summarized by way of five components, the existence of which determines
whether the FET standard will protect the expectations of the investor in a given case:
- The objective conduct of the host state inducing legitimate expectations on the
part of the foreign investor;
- reliance on that conduct on the part of the foreign investors;
- frustration of investor’s expectation by subsequent conduct of the host state;
- unilateralism of conduct of the host state, i.e., absence of meaningful
communication and/or consent with investors; and
- damages for the investor.

C. Detailing the Concept of Legitimate Expectations
1.

Stability and Consistency of the Host State’s Legal Order

Inconsistent conduct by the host state confuses the investor, stands in the way of
proper planning, and is not conducive to an investment-friendly climate. Not
surprisingly, arbitral tribunals have confirmed that inconsistency of conduct by the host
state, as regards the investor’s obligations, is not compatible with the requirement of
FET.34
In MTD v. Chile, the Minister of Economy, Development, and Reconstruction of Chile
approved the investor’s project in a way which prima facie indicated that the project was
feasible in the location chosen by the investor.35 Subsequently, however, another agency
of the host state determined that the zoning regulations stood in the way of the project.
The Tribunal ruled that such inconsistent conduct violated the FET rule. “What the
Tribunal emphasizes here is the inconsistency of action between two arms of the same
Government vis-à-vis the same investor even when the legal framework of the country
provides for a mechanism to coordinate.”36

34.

35.
36.
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Another case in point was Eureko v Poland.37 Here, Poland had agreed that Eureko
would, after the initial investment being the acquisition of the majority of shares of a
local company, have the right to acquire further shares. Poland subsequently reversed
course and refused to offer Eureko more shares. Here, as well, the Tribunal found a
violation of FET.38
In a broader sense, an alteration of the applicable rules by the host state may also be
considered from the viewpoint of consistency. In this respect, the requirement of
consistency overlaps with the need for stability under the FET rule.
Consistency may not be required under circumstances in which the host state had
convincing reason to change course. As regards its legislative power, the host state will,
in principle, have the right to pursue its interests in the light of the new circumstances,
but not ignore the interests of the investor who had earlier adjusted his conduct to the
previous course required by the host state. The power to regulate operates within the
limits of rights conferred upon the investor. Correspondingly, it will have to be assumed
that the reversing of a position in a dramatic manner with serious negative effects upon
the investor will be consistent with FET only in the presence of serious exceptional
reasons, compelling the host state to reverse its previous decision and to require the
investor to re-adapt its business.
Beyond administrative consistency, investment tribunals have also ruled that the FET
standard includes a requirement to maintain a stable legal framework.39 For instance,
the Tribunal in Occidental v. Ecuador explained, “there is certainly an obligation not to
alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has been made.”40
Other cases have addressed the need for consistency and stability of the legal
framework and the investor’s legitimate expectation. In El Paso v. Argentina, the
tribunal stated that a host state “should not unreasonably modify the legal framework or
modify it in contradiction with a specific commitment.”41 This interpretation was also
adopted by the tribunal in Oostergetel v. Slovak Republic.42
The Tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina held that FET requires that a host state
maintains “stability of the legal and business framework” in the state party.43 Similarly,
Alpha v. Ukraine emphasized the duty of the host state not to arbitrarily change the
rules to the detriment of the investor.44

37.
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Eureko Partial Award, supra note 21.
Id. ¶ 234.
Occidental Final Award, supra note 4, ¶ 183.
Id. ¶ 191. See also Marion Unglaube v. Costa Rica, Award, May 12, 2012, para. 220 et. seq.
El Paso Award, supra note 32, ¶ 364.
Oostergetel Final Award, supra note 11, ¶ 224.
LG&E Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 124.
See Alpha Award, supra note 3, ¶ 420.
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In a case involving several changes of rules and policies after the making of
investment, one Tribunal ruled that a “roller-coaster” policy violates the FET rule:
[T]he Tribunal also finds that the fair and equitable treatment obligation was
seriously breached by what has been described above as the “roller-coaster” effect of
the continuing legislative changes. This is particularly the case of the requirements
relating, in law or practice, to the continuous change in the conditions governing
the corporate status of the Project, and the constant alternation between private
law status and administrative concessions that went back and forth. This was also
the case, to a more limited extent, of the changes in tax legislation.45
2.

Expectations Based on the Host State’s Legal Order

The appropriate starting point to determine legitimate expectations is the legal order
of the host state at the time when the investor made its investment. A number of
investment tribunals have relied on the nexus between legitimate expectations and the
host state’s legal order at the time of the investment.46

45.
46
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From a broader perspective, to deny the relevance of the legal order of the host state
in the context of legitimate expectations would assume that stability and predictability of
the laws of the host state have no bearing upon the object and purpose of an investment
treaty and the notion of fair and equitable treatment.
Such assumptions would contravene the spirit in which investments agreements are
generally concluded. It is well-known that major investments are concluded with a longterm perspective, often for more than twenty years. The willingness of foreigners to
invest is linked to the degree of stability in a host state, and stability is one factor for an
investor to determine the location of its investment. BITs are meant to contribute to
stability for these very reasons. The FET standard with its focus on legitimate
expectations appropriately reflects the connection between the flow of investments and
legal stability. The ECT expressly recognizes an obligation on the part of the host state to
provide for legal stability.47
The significance of the laws of the host state for the purpose of determining legitimate
expectations was addressed in Total v. Argentina,48 an ICSID case, decided in 2010. In a
split decision, the majority in this case decided that the legal order could not serve as a
basis for legitimate expectations.49 The majority explained that the legal order would
have been relevant only in case the relevant laws would have been prospective in nature:
Indeed, the most difficult case is (as in part in the present dispute) when the basis
of an investor’s invocation of entitlement to stability under a fair and equitable
treatment clause relies on legislation or regulation of a unilateral and general
character. In such instances, investor’s expectations are rooted in regulation of a
normative and administrative nature that is not specifically addressed to the
relevant investor. This type of regulation is not shielded from subsequent changes
under the applicable law. This notwithstanding, a claim to stability can be based on
the inherently prospective nature of the regulation at issue aimed at providing a
defined framework for future operations. This is the case for regimes, which are
applicable to long-term investments and operations, and/or providing for “fall
backs” or contingent rights in case the relevant framework would be changed in
unforeseen circumstances or in case certain listed events materialize. In such
cases, reference to commonly recognized and applied financial and economic
principles to be followed for the regular operation of investments of that type (be
they domestic or foreign) may provide a yardstick. This is the case for capital
intensive and long term investments and operation of utilities under a license,
natural resources exploration and exploitation, project financing or Build Operate
and Transfer schemes. The concept of “regulatory fairness” or “regulatory
certainty” has been used in this respect. In the light of these criteria when a State
is empowered to fix the tariffs of a public utility it must do so in such a way that
the concessionaire is able to recover its operations costs, amortize its investments

47.
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Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
Total Decision, supra note 3
Total Decision, supra note 3.
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and make a reasonable return over time, as indeed Argentina’s gas regime
provided.50
Apart from an assessment of the general approach favored by the majority, the Total
decision on legitimate expectations raises the obvious issue how to define those laws
which should be considered as ‘prospective’ in nature. What was at stake in the Total
case was the legal order of the host State regulating tariffs, taxes and an indexation
scheme set forth in a law.
In my view, it is difficult to understand why rules on tariffs, taxes and on indexation
should not be considered as forward-looking or prospective; but then, of course, nearly all
substantive laws regulating economic affairs seem to fall into that category of laws which
the Total decision would not classify as prospective. In other words, the principle of the
relevance of the laws of the host state at the time of the investment, for purposes of
determining the scope of legitimate expectations, would in effect be largely undermined
by an exception in case of the lack of a prospective law as postulated by the majority in
Total.
The core of the argumentative structure of the ruling in Total stands in direct contrast
to the widely accepted rule that laws of the host state, at the time of the investment, will
be central for the determination of legitimate expectations. The Total majority fails to
provide for a plausible explanation for its view and, therefore, will not be considered to be
persuasive.
3.

Expectations Based upon Representations

An important component of legitimate expectations, often invoked, concerns
representations by the host state upon which the investor has relied. Here, it needs to be
recognized that unilateral statements are binding, in any event, under customary law if
they are clear and unequivocal, irrespective of the context of fair and equitable
treatment.51 The legitimacy of reliance of representation by the host state to the investor
flows directly from the principle of good faith.
It may be asked be asked whether representations to the investor will be the only
factor to determine the range of legitimate expectations. Obviously, it would be a very
narrow approach to conclude that no other element than representation would be
relevant in this context. There will be no plausible ground, in terms of the inherent
purpose and meaning of either FET in general, or legitimate expectations in particular,
to restrict the sphere of legitimate considerations to representations alone. In particular,
a narrow view restricting legitimate expectations to representations would be

50.
51.
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inconsistent with the broadly accepted reference to the state of the law at the time of the
investment as the primary guideline. Such an approach would also be not compatible
with the assumption that all circumstances must be taken into account for the
determination of legitimate expectations.52
4.

Expectations Based upon Contractual Commitments

Issues concerning legitimate expectations may also arise in the context of contractual
stability. Total stability for a contract is only guaranteed when the contract is
guaranteed by an umbrella clause.53 On the other hand, it is also widely accepted that a
repudiation of a contract by the host state will violate the rights of the investor even in
the absence of a BIT under the minimum standard of international law.54 It is equally
recognized that ordinary commercial disputes are not subject to the rules of a BIT in the
absence of an umbrella clause.55 Within these broader parameters governing contractual
disputes between a host state and a foreign investor, the legitimate expectations of the
investor will have to be identified.
In arbitral practice, the significance of contracts has overlapped with that of the legal
order in cases in which contractual commitments are anchored in general laws. Recent
cases with Argentina as the respondent fall into this category; tribunals have been
inclined in this setting to consider the existence of legitimate expectations in these cases
without distinguishing the role of laws from those arising out of contracts.56 These
rulings have properly considered the general legal order and the applicable contracts in
conjunction and concluded that the investor’s legal expectations were guided by the laws
and the contracts.
As to cases dealing specifically with contracts, the decisions in Parkerings v.
Lithuania,57 and in Hamester v. Ghana,58 questioned whether contractual commitments
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may serve as the basis for legitimate expectations. In contrast, in Rumeli v.
Kazakhstan,59 the Tribunal held that the termination of a contract violated the
claimant’s legitimate expectations. More broadly, Toto v. Lebanon stated that legitimate
expectations “may follow from explicit or implicit representations by the host state, or
from its contractual commitments.”60
From a different angle, and looking at legislative changes affecting contractual
agreements from a broader perspective, Vivendi II v. Argentina61 suggests that corrective
measures reversing course should not be adopted unilaterally, but on the basis of
transparent and non-coercive renegotiations.62 Along the same lines, in 2010, Alpha v.
Ukraine63 has ruled that a host state should not unilaterally arbitrarily change the rules
of the game.
Obviously, the jurisprudence on this point has not yet crystallized in a consistent
manner. In general, it will be noted that on the scale of different types of commitments
by the host state, a contractual obligation is closer to a specific representation than to a
general law. Legitimate expectations will have to be adopted accordingly.
5.

Expectations Based on All Circumstances

A third aspect often considered in the discussion of legitimate expectations pertains to
the recognition of all manifestations of FET, being their dependence on context. A
number of tribunals have repeated that legitimate expectations must be determined in
the light of all specific circumstances of each case.64
Often, a close-up view of individual decisions will indeed confirm and emphasize the
relevance of specific circumstances for the outcome of a case. The ruling in Methanex v
U.S. (Methanex) is on point with the case concerning legislation in California.65 At first
sight, this case seems to contradict the position that the adoption of legislation shortly
after the time of the investment will be difficult to square with the requirement of FET
and the protection of legitimate expectations. However, the Tribunal clearly pointed to
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special circumstances. At the time of the Methanex investments, the substance to be
produced by Methanex in California was under broad scrutiny, and the legislative change
that affected Methanex was clearly “on the horizon” at the time of the investment. In
such a specific setting, absent specific reasons and absent any kind of contractual or
other commitment, it would indeed be difficult to speak of legitimate expectations on the
part of the investor.
6.

Circumstances Opposed to Stability

Another approach was set forth in Duke Energy v. Ecuador (Duke).66 This decision
recognizes that such expectations of the investor will be protected that are “legitimate
and reasonable at the time when the investor makes the investment.”67 The special
element here is that in the view of the Tribunal, all circumstances, including not only the
facts surrounding the investment, but also the “political, socioeconomic, cultural and
historical conditions prevailing in the host State” must be taken into account.68 At the
same time, the Tribunal considered the requirement of a “stable and predictable legal
framework.”69
Inasmuch as the Duke decision points to “political, socio-economic, cultural and
historical conditions” shaping the investor’s legitimate expectations, it is not clear why
and to what extent these conditions need to be considered. The object and purpose of an
investment treaty being the promotion and protection of foreign investment, the relevant
circumstances to be assessed for the determination of legitimate expectations must be of
a nature that is not inconsistent with that object and purpose. As a consequence, respect
for a political history of instability or of hostility toward foreign investment, for instance,
would not be considered to be conducive to the purposes of an investment treaty; indeed,
such a treaty is concluded to overcome such traditions, and the accepted principles of
interpretation relevant to an investment agreement will not allow to introduce elements
of interpretation that stand in contrast to the object and purpose of the treaty.
7.

Legitimate Expectations and the Right to Regulate

In this context, it is also worthwhile to consider such awards of tribunals which have
sought to address the particular relationship between the right of the state to regulate
and the existence of legitimate expectations. Is there an irreconcilable inconsistency
between the right to regulate and the principle of legitimate expectations?
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Saluka v. Czech Republic has stated that the host state’s legitimate right
subsequently, i.e., after the investment in the public interest must be taken into
consideration as well, and may be cited in this context. 70
However, the Tribunal’s position is quite nuanced. In a second, following passage, the
Tribunal calls for “a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations
on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other.”71 In
the third passage, the Tribunal considers that a host state must implement its policies
bona fide by conduct that is, as far as the investor’s investment is concerned, reasonably
justifiable by public policies. Moreover, the decision adds that the State’s conduct must
not violate the requirements of “consistency, transparency, even-handedness and nondiscrimination,”72 and also must not disregard “procedural propriety and due process.”73
Lemire v. Ukraine also speaks of a balance of the right of the investor and of the host
state, but also goes on to say that regulatory measures must not be unfair and must not
hinder a level playing field.74
These considerations by the Saluka and the Lemire Tribunals are multifaceted and
ultimately seem to point in broad terms to a weighing process whose elements seem to
escape generalization. Generally speaking, the Tribunals do not answer the question why
in the context of a BIT, the interests of the state will have the same weight as the
legitimate expectation of the investor, given the BITs nature and its specific purpose to
promote and protect the investor’s interest. BITs are drafted in a one-sided manner with
the aim to provide an investor-friendly climate and to attract foreign investors; absent a
special treaty clause, a rebalancing of interests in the case of a dispute by a tribunal
would not be appropriate.
Another decision addressed the right to regulate and the existence of legitimate
expectations is Parkerings v. Lithuania, rendered in 2007.75 The case concerned a project
in Lithuania in the period of transition from communism to the free market. In this
context, the Tribunal emphasized “each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise
its sovereign legislative power” and also that an investor knows that “laws will evolve
over time.”76
However, this Tribunal as well emphasized the limits of that power under a BIT, and
qualified the right to regulate by adding that a state is prohibited “to act unfairly,

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

28

Saluka Partial Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 304-308.
Id. ¶ 306.
Id. ¶ 307.
Id. ¶ 308 (citation omitted).
Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab., ¶ 267 (Jan. 14,
2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0454.pdf.
See Parkerings Award, supra note 57.
Id. ¶ 332.

Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours

unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power.”77 Ultimately,
therefore, the Parkerings’ decision, as well, rests on the conventional position that a state
has the right to regulate but that it must do so in a fair manner.
The general issue of the relationship between the FET rule and the right to regulate
was properly addressed in ADC v. Hungary:
The Tribunal cannot accept the Respondent’s position that the actions
taken by it against the Claimants were merely an exercise of its rights
under international law to regulate its domestic economic and legal
affairs. It is the Tribunal’s understanding of the basic international law
principles that while a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to
regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of such right is not unlimited
and must have its boundaries. As rightly pointed out by the Claimants,
the rule of law, which includes treaty obligations, provides such
boundaries. Therefore, when a State enters into a bilateral investment
treaty like the one in this case, it becomes bound by it and the
investment-protection obligations it undertook therein must be
honoured rather than be ignored by a later argument of the State’s
right to regulate.
The related point made by the Respondent that by investing in a host
State, the investor assumes the “risk” associated with the State's
regulatory regime is equally unacceptable to the Tribunal. It is one
thing to say that an investor shall conduct its business in compliance
with the host State's domestic laws and regulations. It is quite another
to imply that the investor must also be ready to accept whatever the
host State decides to do to it. In the present case, had the Claimants
ever envisaged the risk of any possible depriving measures, the
Tribunal believes that they took that risk with the legitimate and
reasonable expectation that they would receive fair treatment and just
compensation and not otherwise. 78

D. Due Process
Fair procedure is a basic component of the rule of law and a vital element of FET. A
current expression is found in Article 5 (2)(a) of the U. S. Model BIT 2012: “[FET]
includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the
principle legal systems of the world . . . .”79

77.
78.
79.

Id.
ADC Affiliate Ltd., v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Trib., ¶ 423424
(Oct.
2,
2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0006.pdf
[hereinafter ADC Award].
U.S.
Model
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty
art.
5(2)(a),
2012,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
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Arbitral Tribunals have repeatedly confirmed the significance of fair procedure. For
instance, in Metalclad v. Mexico, a construction permit had been denied to the claimant.80
The Tribunal ruled that the failure to hear the investor amounted to a violation of the
FET standard, stating, “[m]oreover, the permit was denied at a meeting of the Municipal
Town Council of which Metalclad received no notice, to which it received no invitation,
and at which it was given no opportunity to appear.”81
Tecmed v. Mexico also concluded that a failure to notify the claimant in the context of
a revocation of a license was inconsistent with FET, given that the claimant had no
opportunity to express its position.82
In Middle East Cement v. Egypt, the Tribunal found a violation of FET when the host
state had failed to notify the claimant of an upcoming seizure and auctioning of its ship.83
Thunderbird v. Mexico agreed that due process is relevant for administrative
proceedings.84 Genin v. Estonia85 and Waste Management v. Mexico86 confirmed that due
process and the right to be heard are embodied in FET.
In ADC v. Hungary, the Tribunal discussed the meaning of due process and concluded,
in the context of an expropriation clause, that “reasonable advance notice” and a fair
hearing are required to satisfy the due process standard.87
For arbitral proceedings, the Annulment Committee in Fraport v. Philippines88
highlighted the importance of due process, albeit in its own way.
The above case law indicates that the right to be heard will also be applicable in
administrative proceedings, even though a right to judicial review may exist with stricter
procedural guarantees.

E. Transparency
So far, issues of transparency in a narrow sense have not often been before tribunals
in recent years. In the past, a violation of the FET standard was assumed, for instance,
when the host state failed to clarify the rights of an investor, when the circumstances of
an act affecting the investor’s rights were obscure, or when a governmental entity refused
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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to grant a right which had earlier been accorded by another agency of the host state.89
Also, transparency may, in some settings, be closely linked to require a state to avoid a
prolonged state of legal uncertainty and ambiguity.90

F. Freedom from Harassment and Coercion
Harassment and coercion are forms of conduct not to be expected in the ordinary
relationship between the host state and the investor. And yet, arbitral practice has had
to deal with such phenomena. States have come up with various ways of particular
maltreatment, often disguised in the cloak of lawful investigations, unacceptable options,
and forced conduct.91 States may be inclined to invoke their power to tax or to protect the
environment in this context. However, investors must show credible, relevant evidence to
succeed on a claim of this kind.

G. Acting for Cause, Arbitrary Treatment
Tribunals have properly recognized that the fair and equitable treatment does not
allow arbitrary conduct in the relations between the host state and the investor.92
Indeed, it would seem difficult to reconcile arbitrary treatment with fair and equitable
treatment.93
In an investment-friendly climate, fair and equitable treatment requires that the host
state does not affect the foreign investor’s rights without cause. Thus, an official may not
act vis-à-vis an investor because of reasons of a personal nature. On a different level, the
host state government must not act out of xenophobic motives. More important in
practice, fair and equitable treatment will stand in the way of conduct of the host state
that is driven by domestic politics instead of arising out of considerations related to the
investment. Governmental action will also be suspect in case it is not based on a proper
review of facts relevant to a decision. Here, the prohibition of arbitrary treatment
overlaps with the FET rule.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Metalclad Award, supra note 34, ¶ 76; Maffezini Award, supra note 2, ¶ 83; and MTD Award,
supra note 12, ¶ 163.
See Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 164, and PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶ 246.
See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 53, 159.
See, e.g., Parkerings Award, supra note 57, ¶ 315, and Pantechniki S.A. v. Albania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 87 (July 30, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0618.pdf.
In Tecmed, the Tribunal ruled that the arbitrary revocation of a license violates the FET
standard. See Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 154.
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H. Failure to Readjust Equilibrium
A government taking measures which seriously affects an investor’s interests during
an economic crisis will violate the FET standard if it fails to readjust the economic
equilibrium after the crisis has subsided;94 the rules of necessity remain unaffected.

I.

Unilateralism in the Adaptation of Terms

Unilateralism in the adaptation of the basic terms of an investment, contractual or
otherwise, and the ensuing dismantling of the legal framework is, in principle, antithetic
to fair and equitable treatment and to good faith. Depending on the circumstances,
unilateral acts may violate the FET standard.

V. Relationship to Other Principles
Whereas stability and predictability are more abstract concepts linked to the general
contours of an investment-friendly climate, the notion of legitimate expectations
concerns, in a normative-operational mode, the affirmation and the limitations of
stability and predictability in the light of the particular circumstances of a case.
Umbrella clauses and stabilization clauses are, in principle, meant to provide for the full
and unqualified preservation of certain types of obligations during relevant periods.

VI. Future Evolution
How will the FET concept evolve in the coming years? In my view, the standard will
continue to occupy corporations, investment lawyers, arbitrators and host states alike.
This will simply be so because a range of grievances of foreign companies do not fall, at
least not clearly, into the ambit of the more specific categories of protection granted by
BITs.
In practice, the types of actions which affect the foreign investor’s interests have
turned out to be very broad, ranging from tax matters to contractual issues, from tariff
regulations to the conduct of renegotiation, from open communication among state and
investor, including to the organization of a bidding process. In all such areas, and
multiple others, issues of fair treatment may arise, and FET will remain relevant
because other standards may not be applicable.
As to the meaning of the standard, tribunals will likely continue to follow the current
trend and to turn away from broad, subjective assertions and instead apply subcategories
amenable to objective criteria tied to objective conduct on the part of the host state. This
approach has the advantage of a plausible objective and higher degree of persuasiveness.

94.
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The evolving case law has identified, as we have seen, a number of rationally
manageable subcategories. In practice, these will be suitable to decide the practical
issues before tribunals in most cases. In other words, the interpretations and application
of the standard has matured so that subjective views based solely on the arbitrator’s
notion of fairness will, as a rule, no longer be necessary or appropriate.
The task of relevant jurisprudence in the future will be to develop and to refine the
subcategories.
The topic of legitimate expectations will likely remain in the foreground of the FET
rule. The further definition of this central topic remains the most important component
in the development of the FET standard. Fact specific considerations will continue to
dominate its application, and the law as it stands at the time of the investment will likely
permeate the circumstances deciding the individual case.
The ultimate benchmark by which the FET standard and the unfolding relevant
jurisprudence will be judged is whether the results reached by the tribunals, based on
the subgroups, are generally considered by the investment community to be just, and
whether they render justice in a transparent manner, regardless of the more specific
language and explanation upon which the arbitrators may agree. When it is asked what
accounts for the extraordinary career of the FET rule in general and of the principle of
legitimate expectations in particular, the answer must turn to the acceptance of the
results on the basis of the subgroups.
The most plausible explanation of the rise of the FET standard will look to this
question. Was the investor in effect treated in a hospitable climate in a fair manner? It
appears that in most cases, most arbitrators, and equally important, most commentators,
have agreed on the answer reached in the specific cases in light of the given
circumstances. In this way, the usefulness and the operational manageability of the
standard has generally been confirmed by a broad consensus on the concrete results
delivered under the auspices of this cardinal rule of foreign investment law.
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